徐晋涛（中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，农业政策研究中心）

陶然（中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，农业政策研究中心，英国牛津大学中国研究中心）

危结根（中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，农业政策研究中心,瑞典哥德堡大学经济系）

摘要

本文回顾了改革开放以来国有林业企业管理体制的演变，通过多任务委托代理模型探讨了这一演变过程中利润分成和采伐限额等政府政策和管制对国有林业企业经营者激励的影响，特别是信息不对称条件下其对木材采伐的影响,从而解释了国有林业企业普遍存在的超限额采伐的经济原因。通过全国28个省5次全国森林资源普查的面板数据，通过使用国有林业企业的平均面积作为政府与国有林业企业委托-代理关系中信息不对称的代理变量，从实证上验证了信息不对称将会导致超限额采伐和国有林资源增长率下降的假说。

关键词：信息不对称 分成契约 采伐限额 国有森林资源管理

JEL: D82，L21，Q21，Q38

English Abstract

The paper reviews the historical evolution of state forest management system. Under a multi-task principle-agent model, we analyze the impacts of profit sharing and logging quota on the behavior of state forest enterprise managers, especially the impacts of information asymmetry on logging and timber growth in state forest enterprises. Using data from 28 provinces and 5 distinct forest inventories, we examine what factors have lead to declines in forest growth, or equivalently, have increased the likelihood of unsustainable harvesting on China’s state owned forests since the 1970 reforms, which gave increased autonomy to local forest managers. The key premise we assume, and then find to hold, in our empirical model is that the larger the information asymmetry between the state and the forest enterprises, the greater is the reduction in forest volume growth and thus the less sustainably are forests managed. The area of state forests proves to be a very important predictor in unsustainable harvesting, and our results support the large, but untested, body of literature citing anecdotal evidence regarding manager behavior in large state forest holdings.

Keywords: information asymmetry, Share Contract, illegal logging, State Forest Farms

下载